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Corporate Governance Quality and Premature Revenue 
Recognition: Evidence from the UK 
Abstract 
Purpose - Since 2005, wide-ranging concerns have been raised about misleading revenue 
recognition practices, especially during and after the 2008–2009 global financial crisis. There is a 
lack of research into the relationship between corporate governance (CG) mechanisms and 
premature revenue recognition (PRR). 
Design/methodology/approach – This paper uses a Generalised Least Squares (GLS) regression 
analysis of a sample of 854 FTSE 350 firm-year observations. Stubben (2010) discretionary 
revenue (DR) model is used to measure PRR as it is considered less biased, better specified and 
more likely to reduce measurement error than accrual models. 
Findings – The results suggest that the size of audit committees plays an effective role in 
constraining PRR. Moreover, PRR is more likely to be curbed in the presence of small boards 
comprising a higher proportion of non-executive directors. Additional tests reveal that the 
relationship between board size and PRR is non-linear.  
Research limitations/implications - The findings address the concerns of corporate firms, capital 
providers, UK regulators and standard-setters regarding misleading revenue recognition practices 
and should be considered while setting new governance reform recommendations in response to 
changing economic conditions. 
Originality/value - This is the first study that adopts the DR model of Stubben (2010) to capture 
PRR and examines its association with CG internal mechanisms. Moreover, the paper considers 
an important period –2005 to 2013 – in which many significant developments took place.  
Keywords: Corporate governance; Discretionary revenues; Earnings management; Premature 
revenue recognition; UK-listed companies 
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1. Introduction 
This study examines the impact of board and audit committee characteristics on PRR 
practices for a sample of the UK’s largest listed firms by market capitalisation between 2005 and 
2013. Conducting this study is important as UK standard setters and practitioners raised wide-
ranging concerns about misleading revenue recognition practices during our sample period. These 
concerns are derived from the belief that firms will be more inclined to manipulate revenues during 
and after a recession to improve earnings quality (FRRP, 2008; Christodoulou, 2009). 
Undoubtedly, the ethical concerns of financial reporting (FR), and related severely broken 
confidence and respectability, in the past few years, from the perspectives of stakeholders, have 
never been greater (Noriaki, 2011). This has been fuelled by several large corporate scandals in 
the US (e.g. Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and Arthur Andersen) that resulted from lapses in ethical 
accounting behaviour and poor corporate governance practices. 
Questions have been raised by the investing community, regulators, the media, and the 
general public, about the role of boards of directors and audit committees in monitoring FR 
(Srinivasan, 2005; Lin et al., 2006). Significant accounting and CG reforms (e.g. The Sarbanes–
Oxley Act of 2002, Higgs Report (2003) and Smith Report (2003) which were combined in The 
Code) have been introduced in an effort to reinforce ethical behaviour and prevent a recurrence of 
Enron and similar cases. In line with global reforms, the EU’s Council of Ministers required all 
listed European Union companies to adopt IFRS starting in 2005 (European Commission, 2002). 
Post-Enron scandals arose recently throughout Western Europe and showed that such 
scandals were not just a US phenomenon (Carnegie and Napier, 2010). Although such failures 
were not expected to happen in the UK1 (Hayward, 2002), and despite the increasing attention paid 
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to related regulatory reforms, it became clear that the questionable CG practices were not merely 
issues within the US context, but were also of primary concern in the UK. 
The financial media was once again awash with news about British scandals. In 2006, iSoft 
Group Plc (acquired by CSC's Healthcare Group in 2011) launched an investigation into ‘possible 
accounting irregularities’ affecting ‘revenue recognition’ under its former accounting policy in the 
financial years prior to and including the year ending 30th April 2005 (The Gaurdian, 2006). The 
company was in talks with its banks over its revenue recognition policies and had delayed reporting 
its final results (Citywire Money, 2006). In the period between 2009 and 2011, Hewlett-Packard 
(HP) revealed a fraud case against the founder of Autonomy Corporation Plc, now known as HP 
Autonomy, claiming that Autonomy inflated its revenues by US $700m, which misled 
Autonomy’s shareholders and later HP when it acquired Autonomy (Independent, 2015). AssetCo 
Plc announced it had restated its financial accounts for 2010 after the company discovered 
significant overstatement of profits and assets (Reuters, 2012). More recently, Tesco Plc, a large 
UK supermarket chain, has been found to have overstated earnings by £263m after revenue 
recognition irregularities were identified in its first half-year results of 2013 and 2014 (ACCA, 
2015). 
According to the former SEC Chairman, Chairman Arthur Levitt, PRR is the most common 
form of revenue management and is a widespread example of ‘accounting hocus-pocus’ that could 
be used to create illusionary earnings (Magrath and Weld, 2002). Consistent with firms utilising 
discretion in revenue recognition to manipulate earnings, revenue misstatements are one of the 
most common causes of restatements and SEC enforcement actions (Dechow et al., 1996; Durnev 
and Mangen, 2009). As such, discretionary revenues (DR) can be used to measure financial 
reporting quality (FRQ) because although the revenue account is frequently subject to managerial 
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discretion regarding accounting standards to provide positive signals about future prospects, 
auditing standards (e.g., AICPA, PCAOB) “contain a presumption that there is at least one fraud 
risk associated with revenue recognition” (Levy, 2015, p.8). 
Little research has been conducted in the area of DR (Stubben, 2010), and there has been a 
lack of study regarding the role of effective CG monitoring mechanisms in curtailing improper 
revenue recognition. We, therefore, contribute to the literature by extending the existing research 
related to the impact of effective CG mechanisms on FRQ in a number of ways. First, it is 
noteworthy that prior research has used external indicators of earnings misstatements or properties 
of earnings as surrogates for EM. To our knowledge, this is the first study that adopts the DR 
model of Stubben (2010) to capture PRR and examines its association with the board of directors 
(BoD) and AC characteristics. Second, the vast majority of studies that examine FRQ and CG are 
conducted in the US where a mandatory governance system exists (e.g., Xie et al., 2003; Bedard 
et al., 2004; Ghosh et al., 2010). This study provides evidence from a less regulated environment 
of the UK where a voluntary “comply or explain” governance system exists. Moreover, the paper 
presents evidence from an important period –2005 to 2013 – which reflects the significant changes 
that were made to the UK Corporate Governance Code in 2003 through the incorporation of the 
Higgs and Smith reports pertaining to the effectiveness of non-executive directors and audit 
committees respectively. Third, the paper uses corporate governance data manually collected from 
annual reports. This allow us to measure audit committee members’ financial expertise by their 
relevant financial experience (as defined by the UK Corporate Governance Code), unlike extent 
research which used financial literacy and qualifications as a measure for financial expertise.   
Using a GLS random-effect regression analysis of a sample of 854 FTSE 350 firm-year 
observations, we find that the size of the AC plays an effective role in constraining PRR. Moreover, 
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our results reveal that PRR is more likely to be curbed in the presence of a small BoD comprising 
a higher proportion of non-executive directors (NEDs) and in which the roles of the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairman are separated. The UK regulators and standard-setters 
should consider these findings while setting new governance reform recommendations. The 
remainder of this study is structured as follows: the next section reviews the literature and 
formulates a hypothesis suitable for answering the research question. This is followed in Section 
three by a discussion of the method and the sample. Descriptive analyses and findings are reported 
in Section four, and finally, in Section five, conclusions are drawn. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis  
2.1. Literature Review 
There are two main streams in the existing literature that have tackled the relationship between CG 
effectiveness and FRQ. 
The first set of studies uses external indicators of earnings misstatements as a direct 
measure for FRQ. Using the SEC’s Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) and 
the Wall Street Journal Index as proxies for FRQ, Beasley (1996) finds evidence that non-
fraudulent firms have boards with a significantly higher percentage of outside members than those 
of fraudulent businesses. Interestingly, the results indicate that the presence of an audit committee 
does not significantly affect the likelihood of financial statement fraud. Similarly, Dechow et al. 
(1996) find that firms that manipulated earnings are more likely to have boards with a lower 
presence of independent members, more likely to have CEO duality, less likely to have an audit 
committee and are less likely to have outside block-holders. Farber (2005) examines firms 
committing fraud according to the SEC’s AAERs between 1982 and 2000 and finds that fraudulent 
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firms have poor CG relative to a control sample in the year before a fraud is detected. The matched 
comparisons indicate that fraudulent firms have a significantly lower percentage of outside 
directors, fewer audit committee meetings, a smaller number of financial experts on the audit 
committee and a higher proportion of CEO duality. Audit committee size was not statistically 
different between fraudulent and non-fraudulent firms. 
In the context of enforcement in the UK, Peasnell et al. (2001) examine the characteristics 
of companies judged by the Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) during 1990–1998 to have 
had inaccurate financial statements and show that these firms were less likely to have an AC and 
a high proportion of outside directors. Song and Windram (2004) document that companies with 
effective AC, smaller BoD and a large proportion of outside directors are more likely to have a 
lower incidence of adverse rulings by the FRRP than the selected control firms. They find a 
negative relationship between the AC size and financial expertise and an adverse ruling by the 
FRRP. They also report that firms sanctioned for inaccurate financial statements are more likely 
to have an AC that meets less frequently. 
Although SEC and FRRP Enforcement Actions can be claimed to be salient indicators of 
poor FRQ, it is reasonable to suppose that not being accused of fraudulent reporting does not mean 
that a firm adheres to FR ethics and is not manipulating its reported earnings. Even if there is 
compliance with accounting standards, there would still be room for managers to manage reported 
earnings because alternative treatments for accounting events are permitted (Teoh et al., 1998, 
p.1969). For example, a firm can manipulate revenues through using an accounting method that 
either delays or advances revenue recognition yet still comply with the related accounting 
standards (Teoh et al., 1998; Park and Shin, 2004). Accordingly, results of this line of research 
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cannot be generalised to an exemplary population of firms that utilise less aggressive financial 
reporting practices and “more subtle cases of earnings management” (Dechow et al., 1996, p.31). 
The second stream of literature to which our paper is related uses properties of earnings as 
a measure for FRQ. Vafeas (2005) examines the impact of CG characteristics on FRQ between 
1994 and 2000. Poor earnings quality was surrogated by small earning increases and negative 
earnings avoidance. The results indicate that independent ACs have a constraining effect on 
managerial behaviour in EM. Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) conclude that ACs with 
accounting financial expertise can efficiently assess the nature and the appropriateness of 
accounting choices, constrain the aggressiveness of accounting policies and provide incentives to 
avoid the risk of litigation. Klein (2002), Xie et al. (2003), Bedard et al. (2004) and Osma and 
Noguer (2007) all use abnormal discretionary accruals (DACC) as a proxy for FRQ, but the results 
are mixed. More recently, Ghosh et al. (2010, p.1145) argued that BoDs and ACs are the “ultimate 
guardians of financial reporting” and examine how earnings quality – measured by DACC, special 
items and deferred tax – might be influenced by such monitoring mechanisms pre- and post-SOX. 
They show that “[EM] does not vary with board composition and structure, or with audit committee 
composition, expertise, and ownership. In contrast, board size and audit committee size, activity, 
and tenure are associated with [EM]. The strength of this association is considerably weaker for 
the post-SOX years compared to the pre-SOX years. There was no evidence to suggest that the 
overall level of [EM] declined following SOX” (Ghosh et al., 2010, p.1145). González and García-
Meca (2014) examine the relationship between CG mechanisms and DACC in listed Latin 
American firms from 2006 to 2009. They conclude that board independence is limited in curbing 
EM and that BoDs that meet more frequently increase the monitoring of managers. 
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In the UK context, Peasnell et al. (2000) find no evidence of an association between the 
degree of accrual management and the proportion of NEDs in the pre-Cadbury period. In the post-
Cadbury period, however, the results of Peasnell et al. (2000) show that there is less income-
increasing accrual management when the proportion of outside directors on the board is high. 
Similarly, Peasnell et al. (2005) suggest that NEDs who are senior executive managers in other 
firms in which they are acutely aware of FR issues have the potential to detect EM activities. They 
conclude that the likelihood that managers record income-increasing abnormal accruals is less 
likely to occur when there are NEDs on the board. No evidence was found that the presence of an 
AC directly affects upward or downward income manipulation among UK companies. In a more 
recent UK study, Katmon and Al Farooque (2015) conclude that – except for the AC meeting 
variable, which is found to be positively and significantly related to EM – CG mechanisms had no 
influence in reducing opportunistic managerial behaviour between 2004 and 2008. 
Collectively, the literature’s findings on the relationship between CG characteristics and 
FRQ are mixed. As the bulk of studies examine FRQ through EM, the most commonly used proxy 
was DACC (Pomeroy and Thornton, 2008). The results of such studies, however, are questionable 
because accrual models are subject to the criticism that they provide biased and noisy estimates 
(Bernard and Skinner, 1996; Thomas and Zhang, 2001; Hribar and Collins, 2002; Stubben, 2010). 
Thomas and Zhang (2001) examine the ability of various accrual models to forecast accruals and 
find that all models have low forecasting ability and are less accurate in detecting EM than they 
appear. Despite their finding that the Jones Model – one of the most commonly used accrual 
models – exhibits some forecasting ability, Bernard and Skinner (1996, p.313) assert that this 
model “systematically mismeasures discretionary accruals” by classifying non-discretionary 
accruals as discretionary. Hribar and Collins (2002) find that using the balance sheet approach to 
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measure accruals can lead to erroneous conclusions that companies are manipulating earnings 
when no such practice exists. Stubben (2010, p.711) examines the ability of both DR and DACC 
models to detect simulated and actual manipulations and finds that revenue models are “less biased 
and better specified than accrual models”. Unlike DR models, which focus on the revenue 
component of earnings, DACC models do not provide information on the component of accruals 
being managed or whether it is revenues or a particular expense account (Stubben, 2010). 
 
2.2. Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1. Board of Directors and PRR 
As the body that governs the corporation, the BoD is the ‘professional referee’ (Fama, 1980, p.293) 
that serves as one of the monitoring agents with a legal and moral obligation to align managers' 
and shareholders' interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and to ensure that a company is run in the best 
interests of shareholders (Monks and Minow, 2011). However, the BoD will not have effective 
control unless it is capable of curtailing discretionary managerial decisions (Beasley, 1996). As a 
development in the post-Enron period, the recommendations of the UK Higgs report of 2003, 
which were subsequently enacted in The Code, aimed at improving and strengthening the existing 
‘comply or explain’ regulatory governance model. They further focus on the composition of boards 
and their operation and review the role and effectiveness of NEDs. Given that the effectiveness of 
the BoD’s monitoring role depends on its structure and organisation (Peasnell et al., 2005), our 
board variables are as follows: 
Non-executive Directors (NEDs). NEDs are board members who have no business ties to the firm 
aside from their directorship and serve as the real monitors on the board on behalf of capital 
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providers (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Therefore, they are held accountable for FR failures, bear 
reputation costs and are more likely to leave the boards of companies experiencing restatements 
and to subsequently lose directorships at other firms (Srinivasan, 2005). Within agency theory, 
NEDs are expected to mitigate agency conflicts between managers and shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). They will also lead to a reduction in information 
asymmetry, i.e. “imbalance in the information available to the market participants” (Mikołajek-
Gocejna, 2014, p.147), which is a necessary condition for effective boardroom accountability 
(Brennan et al., 2016), resulting in lower PRR. The literature is rich with empirical tests of the 
relationship between NEDs and EM opportunistic behaviour. Beasley (1996) and Dechow et al. 
(1996) find that NEDs are effective in constraining fraudulent FR. Peasnell et al. (2000) also find 
that NEDs became more effective post-Cadbury. Similarly, Klein (2002) finds a negative 
association between NEDs and EM. Therefore, our hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): There is a negative relationship between NEDs and PRR. 
CEO Duality (DUAL). There are differences between the UK voluntary CG system that operates 
on a ‘comply or explain’ basis and the mandatory system adopted in the US under SOX. An area 
of divergence is the constraints on the exercise of board leadership (Aguilera et al., 2006). Most 
UK-listed companies separate the role of Chairman and the CEO while most of the American 
CEOs are also Chairmen of the Board (Higgs, 2003). From an agency perspective, the positions 
of Chairman and CEO should be separated because the same person holding both positions creates 
a conflict of interest, impairs the BoD’s objectivity, makes the board’s role dysfunctional, and may 
adversely affect shareholders’ interests (Jensen, 1993). Collier and Gregory (1999) find reduced 
audit committee activity when the roles of the CEO and the Chairman are not separated. Bowen et 
al. (2002) indicate that the separation of roles is necessary to prevent EM activities, and they find 
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that earnings-smoothing activities are higher in firms with CEO duality. Davidson et al. (2004) 
also conclude that EM occurs more frequently following duality-creating successions than 
otherwise because dual CEO/Chairmen have greater control of the impression created by their 
firm's financial reports and are operating under higher expectations of positive results. This 
suggests that separating the two roles will enhance the board’s monitoring activity and improve 
FRQ practices. Therefore, our hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): There is a positive relationship between DUAL and PRR. 
Board Size (BODSIZE). The relationship between the board size and firm performance, in general, 
and FRQ, in particular, is not straightforward and the literature provides no consensus about the 
direction of that relationship (Xie et al., 2003; Katmon and Al Farooque, 2015). On the one hand, 
consistent with the resource dependence theory, a larger board is “a provider of resources, such as 
legitimacy, advice and council links to other organisations, etc.” (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003, 
p.383) and, therefore, enhances the skills, expertise and knowledge needed to exert effective 
monitoring of FRQ (Ghosh et al., 2010). On the other hand, smaller boards are more effective in 
discharging their oversight role (e.g., Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). They minimise the incremental 
costs of poor communication associated with larger groups (Jensen, 1993) and are less likely to be 
controlled by management (Dechow et al., 1996). Given the fact that UK corporate boards 
constitute both executive and non-executive directors who presumably possess relevant financial 
reporting knowledge and experience, we argue that such boards include the necessary knowledge 
and skills required for exerting an effective oversight role and increasing their size would lead to 
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communication problems that would have a negative impact on FRQ. Therefore, our hypothesis is 
as follows: 
Hypothesis 1c (H1c): There is a positive relationship between BODSIZE and PRR. 
2.2.2. Audit Committees and PRR 
According to KPMG’s Audit Committee Institute (ACI) guidance, “[AC] must remain alert 
to various inappropriate [EM] practices, including improper revenue recognition, and ask 
management and/or the external auditor to describe and explain recent developments in [FR]” 
(ACI, 2006, p.6). Moreover, the KPMG’s ACI survey (2008) concludes that recession-related 
risks, including increased risk of EM during an economic downturn, are a major concern for ACs. 
The AC should be paying close attention to such risks while they continue to focus on refining 
their oversight of FR, internal controls and risk management (ACI, 2008). In the same vein, the 
FRC issued a report in 2009 arguing that as companies suffered from insolvency problems after 
the recession, managers would face more difficulties, which might boost the risk of non-
transparent financial reports with manipulations, errors and omissions (FRC, 2009). ACs are found 
to be associated with error reduction and regulatory compliance (Barako et al., 2006), as well as 
oversight of risk management and internal control systems (Chambers, 2008). Given that the 
effectiveness of the AC monitoring role depends on their structure and organisation, our AC 
variables are as follows: 
Audit Committee Meetings (ACMEET). The number of meetings can be seen as an indicator 
of the activity level exercised by the AC in monitoring FRQ (Collier and Gregory, 1999). Many 
studies suggest that firms with a higher value of ACMEET experience fewer financial restatements 
(Abbott et al., 2004), are less likely to be sanctioned for fraud and aggressive accounting practices 
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(Farber, 2005) and are associated with a lower incidence of EM (Xie et al., 2003; Vafeas, 2005; 
Kent et al., 2010). However, while Bedard et al. (2004) and Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) find 
no association, Katmon and Al Farooque (2015) report that the frequency of ACMEET was the 
only governance variable that is positively and significantly related to EM. We argue that the more 
frequently ACs meet, the more efficiently they discharge their oversight responsibilities and 
constrain PRR. Hence, we hypothesise the following: 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): There is a negative relationship between ACMEET and PRR. 
Audit Committee Financial Expertise (ACEXP). DeZoort (1997) highlights the importance of 
selecting AC members with adequate relevant expertise, proper training and continuing education. 
Defond et al. (2005) find that there is a significantly positive stock market reaction to the 
announcement of the appointment of accounting and financial experts to an AC but no significant 
response to the appointment of non-accounting and non-financial experts. Agency theorists assert 
that ACs are employed in environments plagued with high agency costs to alleviate agency 
problems and to ensure the flow of transparent information between managers and shareholders 
(Pincus et al., 1989). This leads to the importance of ACEXP as a means of reducing agency costs 
by overseeing the effectiveness of the management’s FR policies, which should result in higher 
FRQ. Prior empirical research suggests that ACEXP mitigates financial misstatement (Abbott et 
al., 2004) and constrains EM activities (Xie et al., 2003; Abbott et al., 2004; Bedard et al., 2004; 
Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008; Sun, Lan, & Liu, 2014). Given the concerns raised about firms 
manipulating revenues during our sample period and that revenue recognition is industry-specific, 
we conjecture that AC members with relevant financial experience are effective monitors of a 
firm’s revenue recognition processes. Therefore, our hypothesis is as follows: 
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Hypothesis 2b (H2b): There is a negative relationship between ACEXP and PRR. 
Audit Committee Size (ACSIZE). Jensen (1993, p.865) criticises oversized BoDs and claims that 
“keeping boards small can help improve their performance. When boards get beyond seven or 
eight people, they are less likely to function effectively and are easier for the CEO to control”. 
Nevertheless, it is also widely believed that the large size of an AC can be seen as an indication of 
varied expertise within the committee that can be used to monitor FR practices effectively (Baxter 
and Cotter, 2009). Beasley and Salterio (2001) claim that the extent that AC composition 
voluntarily exceeds minimum mandated levels and includes more outside directors with relevant 
accounting knowledge and experience will strengthen the AC, lead to improved monitoring and, 
therefore, decrease the likelihood of FR risks. Inconsistent results in prior studies also exist for the 
relationship between ACSIZE and FRQ. While Xie et al. (2003), Abbott et al. (2004), Bedard et 
al. (2004),Vafeas (2005), Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) and Baxter and Cotter (2009) find no 
relationship, Ghosh et al. (2010) report that larger ACs are more effective in overseeing the 
financial reporting process. Given the UK Governance Code requirement that all audit committee 
members are independent and the need for directors with relevant financial experience to deal with 
firm-specific revenue recognition practices, we contend that large-sized audit committees will 
increase the breadth of knowledge needed in the absence of executive directors who are more 
knowledgeable of the firm-specific information. Therefore, we hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 2c (H2c): There is a negative relationship between ACSIZE and PRR. 
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3. Research Design 
3.1. Data and Variables 
The initial sample contains all firm–years listed in the UK FTSE 350 in the period 2005 to 2013. 
We exclude firms operating in financial and highly regulated industries because of their particular 
accounting practices (Klein, 2002; Stubben, 2010; González and García-Meca, 2014; Katmon and 
Al Farooque, 2015). Following Katmon and Al Farooque (2015), we also exclude industries 
consisting of fewer than six firms to minimise the possibility of biased estimates in calculating 
earnings management. Since we focus on PRR that leads to an increase in revenues (i.e. income-
increasing firms), we exclude firms with negative DR (i.e. income-decreasing firms) (Koh, 2003). 
The final sample consists of 854 firm-year observations after removing firms with missing data. 
Table one summarises the final sample (Panel A) and presents the distribution of firms by industry 
and year (Panel B). 
[Table one here] 
Data about boards and audit committees were hand-collected from Annual Reports. Data 
for financial variables were obtained from DataStream. We adopt the DR model of Stubben (2010) 
in estimating PRR and model annual receivables as a linear function of the “change in revenues of 
the first three quarters, [and] the change in fourth quarter revenues” (p. 696), “to allow the 
estimated portion of revenues that are uncollected at year-end to vary in the fourth quarter” (p. 
701). As Stubben (2010) concludes, this model is considered as less biased, better specified and 
more likely to reduce measurement error than accrual models. We estimate DR separately for each 
firm-year group including at least six firms with the same two-digit International Classification 
Benchmark (ICB) code. 
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The prior literature (e.g., Klein, 2002; Bedard et al., 2004; Katmon and Al Farooque, 2015) 
indicates the potential importance of further variables in capturing the effects of EM and, therefore, 
these variables are added as controls. Managerial ownership (MANOWN) is included because it 
is expected to lower agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and align managers' and 
shareholders' incentives through curtailing the management’s opportunistic behaviour. Substantial 
ownership (BLOCK) is included because block-holders have a strong incentive to monitor 
managers’ behaviour (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), which could be associated with curtailing EM 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Koh, 2003). Financial leverage (LEV) is also included. The 
association between debt financing and EM is ambiguous (Alsharairi and Salama, 2012). On the 
one hand, there is evidence suggesting that firms with high leverage will have incentives to manage 
their earnings aggressively (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). On the other hand, high leverage 
may restrict managers’ ability to manipulate income-increasing accruals (e.g., Jelinek, 2007). The 
market-to-book ratio, as a measure of a firm's growth opportunities (GROWTH), is included as 
managers of high-growth firms are inclined to avoid missing earnings targets and may manipulate 
earnings upward (Matsumoto, 2002). Cash flow from operating activities (CFO) is included as 
managers of firms facing economic shocks and lower cash flows may utilise accelerated revenue 
recognition practices to hide poor performance (Leuz et al., 2003). Firm size (SIZE) is included as 
large firms are associated with higher political costs, and thus, are more likely to be involved in 
accounting discretion to reduce political attention (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990; Koh, 2003). 
Finally, we include loss in either or both of the previous two years (LOSS), as firms with slightly 
negative earnings are inclined to exercise discretion to report positive earnings (Burgstahler and 
Dichev, 1997). 
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3.2. Model Tested 
To test our hypotheses, the empirical model is set out below. 
PRR = β0 + β1NEDs + β2DUAL + β3BODSIZE + β4ACMEET + β5ACEXP + β6ACSIZE + 
β7MANOWN + β8BLOCK + β9LEV + β10GROWTH + β11CFO + β12SIZE + β13LOSS + ε 
            (1) 
where the dependent variable PRR, measured by DR+, is the estimated positive value of the 
residuals in the following industry-year regression: 
∆ARi,t = α0 + β1∆R1_3i,t + β2∆R4i,t + εi,t       (2) 
where ∆ARi,t represents the annual change in accounts receivable, ∆R1_3i,t represents the change in 
revenues in the first three quarters, and ∆R4i,t represents the change in revenues in the fourth 
quarter, and each is scaled by lagged total assets. 
The independent variables in (1) are as follows: 
NEDs = The percentage of non-executive directors on the board. 
DUAL  = Indicator variable with a value of 1 if the CEO also serves as a chair of the board 
and 0 otherwise. 
BODSIZE = Number of directors on the board. 
ACMEET  = Number of audit committee meetings held in a given year. 
ACEXP  = The percentage of audit committee directors with relevant financial expertise on 
the audit committee. 
ACSIZE  = Total number of audit committee members. 
MANOWN = Percentage of total shares held by executive directors to total number of shares. 
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BLOCK = Percentage ownership of block-holders who hold at least 5% of outstanding 
common shares and are unaffiliated with management. 
LEV  = Total long-term debt to total assets. 
GROWTH  = Market-to-book ratio. 
CFO  = Cash flow from operating activities scaled by lagged total assets. 
SIZE  = Natural logarithm of total assets at year-end. 
LOSS  = Indicator variable with a value of 1 if a firm incurred losses in either one or both 
of the previous two years and 0 otherwise. 
ε  = Error term. 
 
4. Results and Analysis 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table two. Mean and distributional characteristics are reported 
for each variable. Discretionary revenues (DR+) are reported after Winsorisation at the 1% level. 
On average, 3.6% of shares are held by executive directors. Block-holders who are unaffiliated 
with management own 25.4% of the stock. The mean (median) of a firm’s GROWTH is 3.8 (2.62). 
[Table two here] 
Table three reports the Spearman and Pearson correlations among all the variables in our 
model. As the Table illustrates, both correlations indicate a significant negative correlation 
between DR+ on the one hand and ACSIZE and NEDs on the other. There is also a significant 
positive correlation between DR+ and DUAL, GROWTH and CFO, suggesting that non-separation 
of the roles of the CEO and the Chairman along with high-growth firms and firms with large cash 
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flows from operations are more likely to use PRR practices. SIZE is positively correlated with 
ACMEET, NEDs and BODSIZE, suggesting that audit committee meetings along with board size 
and independence increase as firm size increases. Overall, cross-correlation coefficients between 
the key variables are reasonable and do not indicate multicollinearity problems. This is evidenced 
by the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values of the explanatory variables, which are fairly small 
(the highest value is 2.31) and below the cut-off value of 10. 
 
[Table three here] 
 
4.2. Empirical Tests of PRR 
We decide to test our hypotheses using a GLS random-effect regression after conducting the 
Breusch–Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test and Hausman test. The null hypothesis in the LM 
test is that there is no panel effect while the null hypothesis in the Hausman test is that the 
difference in coefficients of the fixed-effect model and the random-effect model is not systematic. 
The estimated results of the LM test reveal that we should reject the null hypothesis and that the 
random-effect model is appropriate. Additionally, the results of the Hausman test fail to reject the 
null hypothesis, thus indicating that the random-effect model is the best estimator. The random-
effect regression is based on firm-level-clustered robust standard errors to adjust for possible 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Petersen, 2009; Zang, 2011). The advantage of using a 
panel effects estimator is that it allows us to control for any possible unobserved heterogeneity in 
our models (González and García-Meca, 2014). The results are reported in Table four. Model (1) 
incorporates the audit committee characteristics and controls. Model (2) integrates the board 
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characteristics and controls, and Model (3) amalgamates both governance characteristics with the 
controls. Models (4) and (5) are the same as Model (3) except for the fact that they present the 
results for the sample firms divided into large (Model 4) and small  (Model 5) firms based on the 
median of total assets as a surrogate for size (See, for example, Zaman et al., 2011). 
Tests of Model (1) show that none of the audit committee characteristics is associated with 
PRR. A significant negative relationship (t = -2.18), however, is found with ACSIZE after 
combining both sets of audit committee and board variables in the same regression (Model 3). This 
suggests that the size of the audit committee does play an effective role in constraining PRR when 
controlling for board characteristics. ACEXP, however, is not associated with positive 
discretionary revenues. This result is ambiguous and contributes to the controversy over the 
definition and kind of financial expertise to be included in audit committees (See, for example, 
Defond et al., 2005). It implies that audit committee members with only relevant financial 
experience may lack the sufficient knowledge required to deal with specific accounting practices 
that require professional judgements. As Defond et al. (2005, p.155) conclude, “accounting-
specific expertise may be [more] important for audit committee members because best practices 
suggest that audit committees are responsible for numerous duties that require a relatively high 
degree of accounting sophistication”. 
All board variables are significantly related to positive discretionary revenues regardless 
of whether or not we separate audit committee and board variables. The tests of Model (3) show 
that, as predicted in H1a, DR+ has a significant negative relationship with NEDs (t = -3.10), 
suggesting that PRR is more likely to be curbed in the presence of a higher proportion of non-
executive directors. DR+ has a significant positive relationship with BODSIZE (t = 2.68), 
suggesting that PRR is more likely to be curbed in the presence of smaller boards. Moreover, in 
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line with our prediction in H1b, DUAL is positively related to discretionary revenues (t = 1.73) 
indicating that firms in which the CEO and the Chairman positions are not separated are more 
likely to recognise their revenues prematurely. 
Finally, the tests of Model (3) show a positive significant coefficient for GROWTH at the 
1% level (t = 2.68), indicating that high-growth firms are more inclined to manipulate earnings 
upward (Matsumoto, 2002) through PRR, and a negative significant coefficient for SIZE at the 1% 
level (t = -3.90), indicating that large firms are less likely to recognise revenues prematurely. The 
results for large firms in Model (4) are the same as those reported in Model (3) except for DUAL, 
which is not statistically significantly correlated with DR+. However, for small firms in Model (5), 
only NEDs and DUAL are associated with DR+. These results suggest that internal governance 
mechanisms of small firms are less stringent in adhering to the recommendations of The Code to 
assure a proper recognition of revenues and enhance FRQ. 
[Table four here] 
4.3. Additional Tests 
To check the robustness of the primary results, we conduct a number of additional tests. First, we 
examine the impact of AC and BoD characteristics on the absolute value of DR (ABSDR), which 
measures the level of opportunistic revenue management activities and focuses on the magnitude, 
rather than the direction, of revenue management. The AC and BoD variables are regressed both 
together and separately. The results in Models (6), (7) and (8) in Table five are consistent with 
those reported in Table four, except for DUAL, which is not associated with ABSDR. This indicates 
that in the presence of an effective board, large-sized ACs are more likely to constrain revenue 
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management. These results also suggest that small-sized boards comprising a higher proportion of 
non-executive directors are more likely to curb revenue management. 
Second, it has been argued that the same CG choices and mechanisms that might be optimal 
in non-crisis periods might be unsuitable during crisis periods (Essen et al., 2013). Essen et al. 
(2013) find that the performance of CG mechanisms is different in crisis periods compared with 
non-crisis periods. As such and given that the year 2008 is considered as the year of the global 
financial crisis, we exclude the year 2008 from the sample to check the robustness of the results. 
Table five reports the findings of ABSDR (Model 9) and positive discretionary revenue (Model 10) 
models, which are qualitatively similar to those obtained from the original models. 
Third, we test our models for potential endogeneity by conducting the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test. This test is used to determine whether the Instrumental Variables (IV) or the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimators is the appropriate estimation technique for our data 
(Baum, 2006)2. Failing to reject the null hypothesis that variables are exogenous indicates the use 
of the OLS instead of the IV estimation techniques (Baum, 2006). The result was statistically 
insignificant and favours the use of OLS estimator. 
Fourth, we measure PRR in our main tests as the positive residuals from the Stubben (2010) 
revenue model. As an additional test to provide some understanding of the association between 
corporate governance mechanisms and revenue deferrals, we further examined the impact of our 
corporate governance characteristics on the negative residuals from the Stubben (2010) model. 
Un-tabulated results reveal that none of the audit committee variables (ACMEET, ACSIZE, and 
ACEXP) is associated with negative discretionary revenues. These results suggest that audit 
committees do not affect revenue deferrals. However, among the board variables, DUAL has a 
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positive relationship with negative discretionary revenues (z=1.80) indicating that revenue 
deferrals are more likely to exist in the presence of CEO duality. BODSIZE is negatively associated 
with negative discretionary revenues (z=-2.54) suggesting that large boards are more likely to 
constrain revenue deferrals. 
Fifth, the prior research argues that the relationship between AC size and committee 
performance is non-linear (Vafeas, 2005). This implies that initially increasing the size of the 
committee would enhance its performance because there are more members on whom to draw; 
however, after the AC grows too large, performance would decline because of communication 
problems and the diffusion of responsibility (Vafeas, 2005). As such, we further examine the 
possibility of non-linearity between ACSIZE and BODSIZE and DR+ by incorporating the squared 
values of ACSIZE (ACSIZE2) and BODSIZE (BODSIZE2) into our main models. The results in 
Table five Model (11) reveal that DR+ is not significantly associated with ACSIZE2 indicating that 
the relationship between DR+ and ACSIZE2 is linear3. However, Model (12) in Table five shows 
that the relationship between DR+ and BODSIZE is non-linear; BODSIZE is initially negative but 
then turns at an inflection point of approximately eight. This suggests that restricting the board 
size to fewer than eight members would lead to a decrease in PRR; however, larger boards 
comprising of eight or more members would lead to the communication problems that are 
associated with larger groups (Jensen, 1993). 
 Finally, we find in our main tests that ACSIZE is negatively associated with PRR. To 
further provide insights into how corporate governance mechanisms can curb PRR and enhance 
FRQ we interacted ACSIZE with each of the board’s variables and tested their impact on PRR. 
Un-tabulated results show that the coefficients of the interaction terms ACSIZE*BODSIZE and 
ACSIZE*NEDs are insignificant. Interestingly, however, we find that the interaction term 
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ACSIZE*DUAL has a negative coefficient significant at the 1% level. This finding suggests that 
ACSIZE moderates the positive relationship between DUAL and PRR and leads to higher FRQ.    
[Table five here] 
5. Conclusion 
This paper is motivated by recent British accounting failures that occurred between 2005 and 2013, 
as well as related stakeholders’ and regulatory concerns regarding misleading revenue recognition 
practices and the role that effective CG may play in fulfilling legal and moral obligations in 
constraining such practices to ensure FRQ. In doing so, we contribute to the literature by 
empirically examining how effective boards and audit committees are in constraining PRR. We 
also aim to contribute to the debate regarding the relationship between specific governance 
characteristics (board size and audit committee size) and FRQ. Although the earnings management 
literature is well developed, to our knowledge, this is the first study of its kind to adopt the 
discretionary revenue model of Stubben (2010) to capture prematurely recognised revenues and to 
examine its association with CG characteristics. 
We find that BODSIZE and DUAL have significant positive coefficients while NEDs has a 
significant negative relationship with DR+ suggesting that small boards that are comprised of a 
higher proportion of non-executive directors and in which the roles of the CEO and Chairman are 
separated are more likely to curb PRR. The results hold after excluding the year of the global 
financial crisis (2008) and also when using absolute discretionary revenues. Additional analyses, 
however, reveal that the relationship between BODSIZE and PRR is non-linear. This implies that 
PRR practices decrease with the increase in BODSIZE until the latter reaches eight members 
beyond which PRR begins to increase. This is consistent with Jensen (1993, p.865) argument that 
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“when boards get beyond seven or eight people they are less likely to function effectively and are 
easier for the CEO to control”. Contrary to the belief that ACs improve corporate accountability, 
strengthen governance, reduce opportunistic managerial behaviour and, therefore, ensure high 
standards in FR, we do not find any of the AC variables to be significantly related to PRR. This is 
consistent with evidence from Katmon and Al Farooque (2015). Interestingly, however, when BoD 
variables are inserted with AC variables in the same empirical model, ACSIZE provides significant 
explanatory power in explaining PRR. This indicates that after controlling for board 
characteristics, large-sized audit committees play an effective role in constraining firms’ PRR 
practices. The additional analyses also reveal that large-sized audit committees are effective in 
constraining general revenue manipulations. 
These findings could be of interest to policy-makers seeking governance reforms and 
shareholders who are concerned with curbing opportunistic management behaviours. For instance, 
our empirical tests provide evidence that audit committee members with relevant financial 
experience are not associated with PRR or revenue manipulation in general. This finding is 
inconsistent with recommendations of The Code that describe AC-specific desirable features to 
assist BoDs in their monitoring role to promote FRQ. Overall, our results provide empirical 
evidence that supports the practitioners' and standard-setters’ calls for a strengthened role for 
boards and audit committees within the oversight of firms’ financial reporting processes. As such, 
UK corporate governance authorities should consider our results while setting new governance 
reform recommendations. As Wolnizer (1995, p.45) notes, “unless accounting practices are 
reformed so that financial statements can be authenticated by recourse to reliable commercial 
evidence, audit committees are red herrings”. Special consideration should also be given to the 
way audit committees are structured and the types of financial expertise of their members. In a 
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similar vein, attention should be paid to ACs' agendas and workloads. The ACI Executive Director 
claims that “the resounding message is that the audit committee can't do it all” (McCollum, 2015). 
The results of KPMG’s 2015 Global Audit Committee Survey also revealed that it is increasingly 
difficult, given the audit committee’s time and expertise, to oversee major risks and challenges in 
FR. An active development, however, is that more boards are reallocating oversight 
responsibilities among their committees and the full board to better balance the workload to allow 
more time for quality discussions and a deeper understanding of the business to improve the 
effectiveness of audit committees (ACI, 2015). This is a possible direction for future research to 
examine the other board’s committees, in a complementary fashion with the ACs and BoDs, to 
effectively oversee FRQ. 
Notes:
1 Because the accounting system is ‘principles-based’ (as opposed to the US ‘rules-based’ system) and the UK was 
exposed to similar failures (e.g. BCCI, Maxwell) in the latter half of the 1980s and during the early 1990s where 
corrective recovery actions had been taken (Kershaw, 2005). 
2 Baum (2006, p 212) denotes that the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is ‘a test of the consequence of using different 
estimation methods on the same equation’.  
3 The descriptive statistics indicate little dispersion in the ACSIZE variable, which may be a source of limitation for 
this test. 
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Table One 
Panel A: Sample Selection Procedures 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2102 2013 
Total 
Sample 
Total firms in FTSE 350 at year-end  352 352 353 358 355 356 356 354 354 3190 
Companies in financial and insurance industries (ICB 8000)  −101 −108 −104 −113 −112 −116 −113 −116 −116 −999 
Companies in utilities industry (ICB 7000)  −13 −12 −11 −10 −9 −9 −8 −7 −7 −86 
Companies with missing corporate governance and financial 
values 
 −59 −40 −35 −18 −14 −18 −25 −13 −14 −236 
Industries having fewer than six firms  −7 −10 −9 −13 −11 −4 −5 −5 −6 −70 
Firms with negative discretionary revenues    −87 −99 −93 −105 −100 −107 −108 −118 −128 −945 
Total sample   85 83 101 99 109 102 97 95 83 854 
              
Panel B: Distribution of Sample Firms by Industry and Year 
ICB code Industry 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Total 
Sample 
0001 Oil and gas 6 6 4 5 10 8 7 9 0 55 
1000 Basic materials 8 6 3 6 9 12 15 12 7 78 
2000 Industrials 25 27 45 39 27 32 27 28 15 265 
3000 Consumer goods 12 8 12 14 17 14 9 14 12 112 
4000 Healthcare 3 3 4 3 6 4 4 2 4 33 
5000 Consumer services 27 28 30 24 32 21 26 19 30 237 
6000 Telecommunications 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 4 3 13 
9000 Technology 4 5 3 8 8 9 5 7 3 52 
Total sample   85 83 101 99 109 102 97 95 83 854 
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Table Two 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
DR+ 854 0.023 0.027 0.005 0.013 0.030 
NEDs 854 0.663 0.431 0.571 0.667 0.727 
DUAL 854 0.047 0.211 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BODSIZE 854 9.172 2.359 7.000 9.000 10.000 
ACMEET 854 4.191 1.596 3.000 4.000 5.000 
ACEXP 854 0.310 0.241 0.200 0.333 0.333 
ACSIZE 854 3.603 0.897 3.000 3.000 4.000 
MANOWN 854 0.036 0.104 0.001 0.002 0.009 
BLOCK 854 0.254 0.168 0.123 0.222 0.353 
LEV 854 0.196 0.168 0.050 0.175 0.298 
GROWTH 854 3.792 21.357 1.540 2.615 4.420 
CFO 854 0.134 0.149 0.070 0.112 0.172 
SIZE 854 5,329,723 14,900,000 580,300 1,350,655 3,212,300 
LOSS 854 0.150 0.357 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DR+ is the estimated positive values of the residuals from the following industry-year regression: 
∆AR i, t = α0 + β1∆R1_3 i, t + β2∆R4 i, t + ε i, t 
NEDs is the proportion of non-executive directors to total board’s size; DUAL is a dummy variable with a 
value of 1 if the CEO also serves as a chair of the board, 0 otherwise; BODSIZE is the total number of 
directors sitting on the board; ACMEET is the number of audit committee meetings held during the financial 
year; ACEXP is the percentage of audit committee directors with relevant financial expertise on the audit 
committee; ACSIZE is the total number of audit committee members; MANOWN is the percentage of total 
shares held by executive directors to total number of shares; BLOCK is the percentage ownership of block-
holders who hold at least 5% of outstanding common shares and are unaffiliated with management; LEV is 
total long-term debt to total assets; GROWTH is market-to-book ratio; CFO is cash flow from operating 
activities scaled by lagged total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at year-end; LOSS is an 
indicator variable with 1 if a firm incurred losses in either one or both of the previous two years and 0 
otherwise. 
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Table Three 
Spearman (Lower Triangle) and Pearson (Upper Triangle) Correlations* 
  DR+ ACMEET ACSIZE ACEXP NEDs DUAL BODSIZE MANOWN BLOCK LEV GROWTH CFO SIZE LOSS 
DR+ 1 −0.0218 −0.0962 −0.013 −0.0686 0.0847 0.0295 0.0278 −0.0038 −0.121 0.0578 0.0694 −0.1702 0.0041 
ACMEET −0.0023 1 0.2168 −0.0293 0.115 0.0603 0.346 −0.0558 −0.0477 −0.0212 0.0377 0.0213 0.3624 −0.0173 
ACSIZE −0.0987 0.1804 1 −0.1954 0.1025 −0.0255 0.4058 −0.1002 −0.133 0.0636 −0.0308 −0.0361 0.3543 −0.0556 
ACEXP 0.0238 −0.0333 −0.3287 1 0.0082 0.0246 −0.0633 −0.0124 −0.0092 −0.0094 −0.0026 0.0175 0.0069 0.0253 
NEDs −0.1088 0.2906 0.2199 0.0163 1 −0.0466 0.0828 −0.0561 0.0299 −0.0014 −0.005 −0.0009 0.1839 0.0264 
DUAL 0.0532 −0.0428 −0.0356 0.0183 −0.1232 1 −0.0609 0.2336 0.0219 −0.038 −0.0289 0.0038 −0.1222 0.0001 
BODSIZE −0.0351 0.3151 0.4183 −0.1266 0.1226 −0.0697 1 −0.0436 −0.0884 0.042 0.033 0.0078 0.5289 −0.0293 
MANOWN 0.1617 −0.1979 −0.2288 0.0099 −0.3734 0.1698 −0.1625 1 0.0413 −0.1046 −0.0027 0.0006 −0.1508 0.0745 
BLOCK 0.0186 −0.0798 −0.1283 0.0232 0.0313 0.0267 −0.1871 0.1263 1 −0.0666 0.0062 0.0283 −0.2041 0.0968 
LEV −0.1575 −0.0026 0.0776 −0.0568 0.112 −0.0364 0.0774 −0.1993 −0.0739 1 −0.0068 −0.134 0.2269 0.029 
GROWTH 0.0893 0.0501 0.0592 −0.0692 −0.0277 0.0337 0.0707 −0.0136 −0.1187 −0.0772 1 0.4577 −0.0713 −0.0249 
CFO 0.0958 0.0305 −0.0012 0.0029 −0.0316 0.0104 0.0113 0.0613 −0.0569 −0.135 0.4639 1 −0.2504 −0.1412 
SIZE −0.2058 0.3132 0.306 −0.0275 0.3834 −0.1526 0.4984 −0.4500 −0.2502 0.3272 −0.2018 −0.2327 1 −0.0407 
LOSS −0.0184 0.0336 −0.0436 0.0266 −0.0076 0.0001 −0.0157 0.0495 0.1164 0.0226 −0.1406 −0.2079 −0.028 1 
DR+ is the estimated positive values of the residuals from the following industry-year regression: 
∆AR i, t = α0 + β1∆R1_3 i, t + β2∆R4 i, t + ε i, t 
NEDs is the proportion of non-executive directors to total board’s size; DUAL is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the CEO also serves as a chair of the board, 0 otherwise; BODSIZE is the 
total number of directors sitting on the board; ACMEET is the number of audit committee meetings held during the financial year; ACEXP is the percentage of audit committee directors with 
relevant financial expertise on the audit committee; ACSIZE is the total number of audit committee members; MANOWN is the percentage of total shares held by executive directors to total number 
of shares; BLOCK is the percentage ownership of block-holders who hold at least 5% of outstanding common shares and are unaffiliated with management; LEV is total long-term debt to total 
assets; GROWTH is market-to-book ratio; CFO is cash flow from operating activities scaled by lagged total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at year-end; LOSS is an indicator 
variable with 1 if a firm incurred losses in either one or both of the previous two years and 0 otherwise. 
*Bolded coefficients are statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Table Four 
Results: Discretionary Revenues and Board and Audit Committee Characteristics   
 Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
 Variables (z-stat) (z-stat) (z-stat) (z-stat) (z-stat) 
Intercept 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.077*** 0.042*** 0.039 
 (5.91)    (5.85)    (6.17)    (2.72) (1.06)    
NEDs  −0.003**  −0.002*** −0.002*** −0.028*   
  (−2.48)    (−3.10)    (−3.91) (−1.83)    
DUAL  0.013*   0.014*   −0.003 0.021**  
  (1.65)    (1.73)    (−0.53) (2.12)    
BODSIZE  0.002**  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001 
  (2.26)    (2.68)    (2.69) (1.00)    
ACMEET 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.32)     (−0.35)    (−0.12) (−0.36)    
ACEXP −0.003  −0.003 −0.001 −0.004 
 (−0.62)     (−0.58)    (−0.23) (−0.40)    
ACSIZE −0.002  −0.003**  −0.003** −0.001 
 (−1.30)     (−2.18)    (−1.96) (−0.50)    
MANOWN 0.003 −0.001 −0.003 0.028 −0.029*** 
 (0.20)    (−0.08)    (−0.20)    (0.93) (−3.18)    
BLOCK −0.008 −0.007 −0.008 −0.014** 0.000 
 (−1.27)    (−1.24)    (−1.34)    (−2.28) (−0.02)    
LEV −0.009 −0.009 −0.009 −0.014* −0.005 
 (−1.40)    (−1.42)    (−1.51)    (−1.89) (−0.57)    
GROWTH 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** −0.000 0.000*** 
 (2.63)    (2.92)    (2.68)    (−0.13) (2.99)    
CFO 0.000 −0.003 −0.002 0.001 −0.002 
 (−0.04)    (−0.42)    (−0.35)    (0.06) (−0.30)    
SIZE −0.0029*** −0.004*** −0.004*** −0.002 0.000 
 (−3.27)    (−4.10)    (−3.90)    (−1.45) (0.16)    
LOSS 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 −0.001 
 (0.24)    (0.24)    (0.22)    (0.51) (−0.24)    
      
N 854 854 854 427 427 
R2 4.15% 6.04% 6.75% 7.09% 4.88% 
***, **, * = Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
The dependent variable is DR+. It is the estimated positive values of the residuals from the following industry-year regression: 
∆AR i, t = α0 + β1∆R1_3 i, t + β2∆R4 i, t + ε i, t 
NEDs is the proportion of non-executive directors to total board’s size; DUAL is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the CEO 
also serves as a chair of the board, 0 otherwise; BODSIZE is the total number of directors sitting on the board; ACMEET is the 
number of audit committee meetings held during the financial year; ACEXP is the percentage of audit committee directors with 
relevant financial expertise on the audit committee; ACSIZE is the total number of audit committee members; MANOWN is the 
percentage of total shares held by executive directors to total number of shares; BLOCK is the percentage ownership of block-
holders who hold at least 5% of outstanding common shares and are unaffiliated with management; LEV is total long-term debt to 
total assets; GROWTH is market-to-book ratio; CFO is cash flow from operating activities scaled by lagged total assets; SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of total assets at year-end; LOSS is an indicator variable with 1 if a firm incurred losses in either one or both of 
the previous two years and 0 otherwise. 
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Table Five 
Additional Tests: Discretionary Revenues and Board and Audit Committee Characteristics   
 Model 6  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
 Variables (z-stat) (z-stat) (z-stat) (z-stat) (z-stat) (z-stat) (z-stat) 
Intercept 0.075*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.080*** 0.084*** 0.091*** 0.115*** 
 (7.66) (7.76)    (8.01) (8.08)    (6.30)    (5.40) (5.87)    
NEDs  −0.002*** −0.002*** −0.002***  −0.002*** −0.002*** −0.002*** 
  (−2.66)    (−3.21) (−3.03)    (−3.35)    (−2.98) (−3.30)    
DUAL  0.004 0.005 0.007 0.016 0.014* 0.013    
  (0.73)    (0.79) (1.14)    (1.81)    (1.74) (1.61)    
BODSIZE  0.001**  0.002*** 0.002***  0.002*** 0.002*** −0.006**  
  (2.37)    (2.80) (3.00)    (3.19)    (2.77) (−2.02)    
BODSIZE2       0.000**  
       (2.52)    
ACMEET 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000    
 (−0.38)  (−0.99) (−0.64)    (−0.11)    (−0.36) (−0.56)    
ACEXP −0.002  −0.002 −0.003 −0.004 −0.003 −0.002   
 (−0.81)  (−0.67) (−1.09)    (−0.79)    (−0.55) (−0.41)    
ACSIZE −0.001  −0.002** −0.002**   −0.003**   −0.010* −0.002*   
 (−1.33)  (−2.31) (−2.30)    (−2.12)    (−1.77) (−1.84)    
ACSIZE2      0.001                 
      (1.44)                 
MANOWN 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 −0.003 −0.003 −0.002    
 (0.40) (0.33)    (0.24) (−0.07)    (−0.16)    (−0.18) (−0.14)    
BLOCK 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.002 −0.010 −0.008 −0.010*   
 (−0.00) (0.08)    (−0.06) (−0.59)    (−1.55)    (−1.34) (−1.70)    
LEV −0.001 −0.002 −0.002 −0.003 −0.007 −0.009 −0.008   
 (−0.24) (−0.39)    (−0.46) (−0.58)    (−1.04)    (−1.55) (−1.27)    
GROWTH 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000**  
 (1.52) (1.46)    (1.39) (1.59)    (1.54)    (2.62) (2.57)    
CFO 0.011* 0.010 0.010* 0.009 −0.002 −0.002 −0.003 
 (1.87) (1.60)    (1.67) (1.35)    (−0.28)    (−0.38) (−0.39)    
SIZE −0.003*** −0.005*** −0.004*** −0.004*** −0.004*** −0.004*** −0.004*** 
 (−4.97) (−5.76)    (−5.52) (−5.54)    (−4.39)    (−3.97) (−4.15)    
LOSS 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001] 0.001    
 (0.64) (0.67)    (0.64) (0.61)    (0.13)    (0.24) (0.33)    
        
N 1799 1799 1799 1595 755 854 854 
R2 4.13% 5.81% 6.20% 6.51% 6.68% 6.81% 7.71% 
Inflection point            7.89 
***, **, * = Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
The dependent variable is DR. It is the estimated positive values of the residuals from the following industry-year regression: 
∆AR i, t = α0 + β1∆R1_3 i, t + β2∆R4 i, t + ε i, t 
NEDs is the proportion of non-executive directors to total board’s size; DUAL is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the CEO 
also serves as a chair of the board, zero otherwise; BODSIZE is the total number of directors sitting on the board; ACMEET is the 
number of audit committee meetings held during the financial year; ACEXP is the percentage of audit committee directors with 
relevant financial expertise on the audit committee; ACSIZE is the total number of audit committee members; MANOWN is the 
percentage of total shares held by executive directors to total number of shares; BLOCK is the percentage ownership of block-
holders who hold at least 5% of outstanding common shares and are unaffiliated with management; LEV is total long-term debt to 
total assets; GROWTH is market-to-book ratio; CFO is cash flow from operating activities scaled by lagged total assets; SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of total assets at year-end; LOSS is an indicator variable with 1 if a firm incurred losses in either one or both of 
the previous two years and 0 otherwise. 
 
